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An Evaluation of Canada's Dangerous Offender 
Legislation * 
Jacques J.M. SHORE** 
L'auteur s'intéresse dans cet article à la partie XXI du Code criminel 
relative aux délinquants dangereux. L'évolution historique des dispositions 
législatives concernées est tracée à l'aide d'une comparaison avec la législation 
en vigueur en 1977. Les problèmes juridiques découlant de ces dispositions et les 
objectifs de la législation sont ensuite présentés ainsi que la procédure 
spécifique d'obtention d'une sentence de période indéterminée. L'auteur décrit 
les difficultés d'application de la loi et identifie certains résultats incongrus 
transparaissant de la jurisprudence récente. De plus, l'impact potentiel des 
articles 1, 9, 11 et 12 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés sur la 
partie XXI du Code criminel est évoqué. 
L'auteur critique les procédures de remise en liberté des délinquants 
dangereux et suggère que les tribunaux plutôt que la Commission nationale des 
libérations conditionnelles soient habilités à rescinder une sentence de période 
indéterminée. 
L'article conclut en recommandant que les dispositions existantes de la loi 
relatives aux délinquants dangereux soient abrogées et qu'un nouveau régime 
sentenciel, excluant l'option d'une sentence pour une période indéterminée, soit 
établi. L'auteur suggère également, advenant que la législation actuelle relative 
aux délinquants dangereux perdure, que soient réévaluées les règles de preuve et 
d'audition responsables de l'échec du système existant. 
* This article is updated July 12, 1984. The author wishes to thank Stanley Cohen, Michael 
Petrunik and Alison MacPhail for their helpful suggestions. Nevertheless, responsibility for 
the views expressed is the author's. This article is written in a personal capacity and does 
not represent the position of the Ministry of the Solicitor General. 
** Of the Ontario Bar, Executive Assistant and Research Program Administrator (Legal/ 
Constitutional), the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada. Formerly Policy Analyst, Policy Branch (Criminal Justice), Ministry 
of the Solicitor General of Canada. 
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Introduction 
<• It seems clear to me that God designed us to live in society —just as He has 
given the bees the honey; and as our social system could not subsist without 
the sense of justice and injustice, He has given us the power to acquire that 
sense. » (François Voltaire). 
Our Canadian criminal justice system must be vigilently monitored if it 
is to continue to act in a manner consistent with the fundamental principles 
of justice. The elements which cause injustice within the system and 
mechanisms which in the result cause unjust consequences must be elimi-
nated. This task is incessant as society and its attitudes transform. 
It is the goal of identifying those injustices which plague Part XXI of the 
Criminal Code which motivates the author to prepare this paper. 
This brief overview of Canadian Dangerous Offender legislation is 
intended to acquaint the reader with the problems associated with the 
current provisions and provide a short evaluation of its contents. The 
material also includes a brief discussion on recent jurisprudence in the area 
and comments on what effects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
may have on this legislation. 
1. Background 
The current dangerous offender provisions ' are contained in Part XXI 
of the Criminal Code.2 These provisions, proposed and enacted as part of the 
1977 Criminal Law Amendment Act, regarding « Peace and Security», came 
1. Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 53, s. 14. The provisions were proclaimed in 
force October 16, 1977. 
2. Criminal Code, sections 687 to 695.1. 
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about as a response to the considerable amount of criticism raised against 
the previous « habitual criminal » and « dangerous sexual offender » sections 
of the Criminal Code. 
The former «habitual criminal» legislation was first enacted in 1947. 
Under these provisions it was possible to impose preventive detention if 
(a) the accused was found to be an « habitual criminal » and (b) the court was 
of the opinion it was expedient for the public's protection to sentence him to 
preventive detention. If the person became rehabilitated he was released on 
parole, but if he had not, he was kept under custody until there was strong 
evidence that he had been rehabilitated. 
Between 1947 to 1977, the Criminal Code defined « habitual criminals» 
as : 
— having three previous convictions for an indictable offense for which 
the maximum penalty is at least five years, and 
— « leading persistently a criminal life ». 
Critics and legislators expressed concern that the legislation was not 
only being applied to dangerous offenders but also to menaces and 
nuisances.3 Such a view is to be found in even the highest levels of the 
judiciary. In Mendick v. The Queen4, Mr. Justice Ritchie in his dissenting 
opinion (Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, J.J., concurring) held in the Supreme 
Court of Canada that being a « menace» to society was sufficient reason to 
sentence a person to preventive detention as an «habitual criminal». 
According to Ritchie, J. the element of dangerousness did not need to be 
found in order to grant an « habitual criminal» application. He stated : 
I do not find any decision so far rendered by this court which makes it plain 
that a sentence of preventive detention is only imposed on persons who have 
been guilty of repeated crimes of violence, and I can find nothing in S. 660 itself 
to indicate that it is directed solely to the protection of the public against 
violence, it rather appears to me that the section is to be applied in the cases of 
persons who have shown themselves to be so habitually addicted to serious 
crime as to constitute a threat to other persons or property in any community 
in which they live and for so long as they remain at large without supervision.5 
It was the opinion of the Ouimet Committee6 that these legislative 
provisions were not effective measures for the protection of the public. The 
3. Canadian Committee on Corrections: Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections 
(Ouimet Committee), Ottawa, Information Canada, 1969, page 252. 
4. [1970] 1 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.). 
5. Ibid., page 11. Cartwright, C.J.C., on page 6, expressed the majority's view by saying that 
preventive detention can only be applied where the offender constitutes « so grave a 
menace» that the protection of the public requires that freedom be deprived for such a 
period. 
6. Supra, footnote 3. 
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Committee found them too infrequently and randomly applied to be a 
deterrent. Many « habitual criminals» were considered not to be a threat to 
personal safety, but rather « nuisances » and merely « petty persistent » 
property offenders. It was believed that the requirement of three prior 
convictions often prevented its use against truly dangerous offenders. 
Furthermore, it was concluded that the legislation was being applied in 
an inequitable and discriminatory manner because of local and regional 
variance,7 different prosecutorial and judicial attitudes8 towards preventive 
detention, and unfair use of plea-bargaining with persistent property 
offenders. 
Persons sentenced as « habitual criminals» before 1977 are still subject 
to possible lifetime preventive detention, despite the abolition of the law.9 
The National Parole Board was required to review all habitual offender cases 
within the year after the new legislation came into force and each year 
thereafter (as under the old legislation) in order to determine whether any 
offenders so detained should be released.10 
There are currently 36 such « habitual » offenders in Federal peniten-
tiaries, and 54 are on parole." 
With regard to the «Dangerous Sexual Offender» provisions which 
were abolished in 1977, the Criminal Code defined such offenders as : 
— someone convicted of rape, indecent assault, gross indecency, 
buggery, bestiality or sexual intercourse with a female under seventeen 
(or of an attempt to commit any of the above), and 
— who, by his conduct in any sexual matter, has shown a failure to 
control his sexual impulses, and 
7. In 1976 approximately half of all «habitual criminals» in Canada came from British 
Columbia. 
8. In its decision in Halchwell v. The Queen, (1975) 21 C.C.C. (2d) 201, the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that the dominant purpose of the legislation was to protect the public from 
an accused who had shown a propensity for violent crimes, the determination of which 
involved a balance of the legitimate right of society to be protected with the right of the 
accused to freedom after serving the sentence imposed for the substantive offences 
committed. The Court thereafter rejected Justice Ritchie's dissenting opinion in Mendick v. 
The Queen, supra, footnote 4. 
9. For additional background in this area, see M. JACKSON, Sentences thai Never End: The 
Report on the Habitual Criminal Study, unpublished paper prepared for the British 
Columbia Connections Association, Dec. 1982. 
10. Section 695.1(2), Criminal Code. 
11. Data according to Operational Information Services — Correctional Service Canada 
(Analysis and Information Section), as of April 30, 1983 (unpublished). 
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— who is likely to cause injury pain or other evil to any person, through 
failure in future to control his sexual impulses.12 
Critics contended that these sections were not broad enough to permit 
preventive detention of dangerous offenders who do not commit sexual 
offences. The Ouimet Committee 13 believed that many of those caught by 
these provisions did not present a threat of physical violence and that the 
legislation was being applied in an inequitable and inconsistent manner. 
As was the case with «habitual criminals» before 1977, «dangerous 
sexual offenders » were subject to a similar review by the National Parole 
Board under the new legislation.14 
Under the old legislation there are currently 50 « Dangerous Sexual 
Offenders» in Federal penitentiaries and an additional 32 on parole.15 
2. Current Dangerous Offender Legislation 
On March 8, 1976, the Minister of Justice, Ron Basford, stated the 
following in the House of Commons : 
indeterminate sentencing should no longer be used against criminals who do 
not pose a continuing and serious threat to the life, safety and well-being of 
others... This type of sentencing, however, is a necessary mechanism to protect 
society against dangerous criminals when it is virtually impossible, at the point 
of sentencing, for a judge to determine the appropriate length of sentence to be 
imposed...16 
Accordingly, Mr. Basford acknowledged there were individuals who 
were not dangerous, yet sentenced to preventive detention. 
New legislation was introduced in Parliament in 1976 and proclaimed in 
force on October 6, 1977. Under the legislation the requirements for a 
«Dangerous Offender» designation are provided in section 688 of the 
Criminal Code. It states : 
688. Where, upon an application made under this Part following the conviction 
of a person for an offence but before the offender is sentenced therefor, it is 
established to the satisfaction of the court 
(a) that the offence of which the offender has been convicted is a serious 
personal injury offence described in paragraph (a) of the definition ofthat 
12. Section 689 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Sections 687 to 695 were repealed and a 
new Part XXI (s. 687 to 695.1 ) was substituted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, S.C. 
1976-1977, c. 53, s. 14. The sections were proclaimed in force on October 16, 1977. 
13. Supra, footnote 3. 
14. Supra, footnote 10. 
15. Supra, footnote II. 
16. House of Commons Debates — Official Report (Hansard), page 11582, March 8, 1976. 
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expression in section 687 and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, 
safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of 
evidence establishing 
(i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for 
which he has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his 
behaviour and a likelihood of his causing death or injury to other persons, 
or inflicting severe psychological damage upon other persons, through 
failure in the future to restrain his behaviour, 
(ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, or which the 
offence for which he has been convicted forms a part showing a substantial 
degree of indifference on the part of the offender as to the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences to other persons of his behaviour, or 
(iii) any behaviour by the offender, associated with the offence for which he 
has been convicted, that is of such a brutal nature as to compel the 
conclusion that his behaviour in the future is unlikely to be inhibited 
by normal standards of behavioural restraint, or 
(b) ... 
Sect ion 687 defines « ser ious pe r sona l injury offence » as : 
(a) an indictable offence (other than high treason, treason, first degree murder 
or second degree murder) involving 
(i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or 
(ii) conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another 
person or inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage upon 
another person, 
and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years 
or more, or 
(b) an offence mentioned in section 144 (rape) or 145 (attempted rape) or 
an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in section 146 
(sexual intercourse with a female under fourteen or between fourteen 
and sixteen), 149 (indecent assault on a female), 156 (indecent assault on 
a male) or 157 (gross indecency). 1976-77, c. 53, s. 14. 
U n d e r the a l t e rna t e ca tegory of « d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r » , sec t ion 688(b) 
rep laces the fo rmer « d a n g e r o u s sexual o f f ende r» p rov i s ions a n d d e m a n d s 
the fol lowing for a posi t ive f inding : 
(b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious 
personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the definition ofthat 
expression in section 687 and the offender, by his conduct in any sexual 
matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which 
he has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his sexual impulses 
and a likelihood of his causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons 
through failure in the future to control his sexual impulses... 
As was t he case in the p r e v i o u s leg is la t ion , it is necessa ry t h a t t he 
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l of the p r o v i n c e in which the of fender was t r i ed , e i the r 
before or after the m a k i n g of the app l i ca t i on , consen t t o the app l i ca t ion . 1 7 
17. Section 689(1 )(a), Criminal Code. 
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Evidence of at least two psychiatrists was required under the old 
provisions as proof for a dangerous sexual offender application, but not for 
a determination of habitual criminal designation. The new sections require 
the evidence of at least two psychiatrists in all cases. One psychiatrist must 
be nominated by the prosecution and the other nominated by the offender.18 
Under the 1977 provisions, when an individual is found by the court to 
be a « dangerous offender » and has been sentenced to a penitentiary for an 
indeterminate period, the National Parole Board reviews the condition, 
history and circumstances ofthat person after three years of custody and not 
later than every two years thereafter to determine whether parole should be 
granted.19 
There are currently 29 « dangerous offenders » serving indeterminate 
terms of imprisonment in Federal penitentiaries. An additional two offenders 
have been designated as « dangerous » under the legislation but were given 
definite sentences in lieu of the usual indeterminate period. None of these 
offenders have been granted any form of conditional release.20 Dangerous 
offenders applying for parole release are subject to the same criteria as other 
offenders seeking parole. The offender must not constitute an « undue risk », 
his grant of parole must aid in his « reform and rehabilitation», and must 
have « derived the maximum benefit from imprisonment. »21 
3. Experience and Criticism Regarding the Present Legislation 
While Parliament was successful in eliminating some of the injustices 
that arose from the previous dangerous offender provisions of the Criminal 
Code, there still exists a significant amount of criticism regarding the current 
dangerous offender legislation.22 
Critics such as Greenland believe that the former provisions were being 
applied inconsistently and arbitrarily by Crown attorneys because the 
sections were applied to a broad variety of offenders.23 From his research 
18. Section 690, Criminal Code. 
19. Section 695.1, Criminal Code. 
20. Supra, footnote 11. 
21. Parole Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2, s. 10. 
22. See : Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper »11, Imprisonment and Release, 
1975. See also, Dangerous Sexual Offender Legislation 1948-77 — A Misadventure in State 
Psychiatry, 1981, unpublished paper presented to the Canadian Psychiatric Association; 
G.GREENLAND, «The Prediction and Management of Dangerous Behaviour», (1978), 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 215 ; M.E. SCHIFFER, Psychiatry Behind Bars, A 
Legal Perspective, Toronto, Butterworths, 1982, p. 289. 
23. Supra, footnote 22, p. 37. 
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Greenland states that only approximately two per cent of all sexual offenders 
were subjected to proceedings under the former dangerous offender provi-
sions.24 He also criticized the Attorneys-General for not issuing guidelines to 
assist Crown counsel with the selection process. As a result, Greenland feels 
the threat of dangerous offender prosecution is always available to the 
Crown to assist in obtaining a desired plea bargain with the defence.25 In the 
author's opinion, Greenland's appraisal applies equally to the current 
provisions. 
The use of the threat of a « dangerous offender » application has been 
admitted by many Crown attorneys. Because of the often heavy work load 
plaguing Crown counsels, unless the case is considered as most serious under 
the circumstances, the plea negotiation is often considered a welcome aid. 
Furthermore, defence lawyers, finding it in the best interests of their clients, 
tend to avoid risking the possibility of having their clients sentenced for a 
number of years without any idea of when release can be expected. The 
threat being so severe leaves the accused with little choice. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that while the person who is sentenced 
to an indeterminate period of detention may appeal to the Court of Appeal 
against the sentence on any ground of law or fact, or mixed law and fact,26 
the Attorney-General may only appeal against the dismissal of an application 
for a dangerous offender order on any ground of law.27 Therefore it has been 
argued by Crown attorneys that if they cannot convince the reluctant trial 
judge at first instance that the accused is in fact «dangerous» as per the 
provisions of Part XXI of the Criminal Code, and no error in law has taken 
place, their efforts become a waste of time. 
It also appears that judges are quite reluctant to send individuals to 
prison for indeterminate periods. While a life sentence is very lengthy in 
terms of sentence, it still provides for a definitive eligibility date for parole. 
Recently, a judge of the Supreme Court of Ontario refused to imprison 
indefinitely a man who raped a woman (not his first offence) because he was 
« not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was likely to 
commit rape or cause harm again. »28 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Section 694(1), Criminal Code. 
27. Section 694(2), Criminal Code. 
28. This case was provided as an example of the Court's reluctance to use the Dangerous 
Offender Legislation in an article by Cyril Greenland, prepared for the Globe and Mail, 
July 23, 1982, entitled « Making the Sentence Fit the Sex Criminal ». No citation for this 
case was given. 
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In 1975 the Law Reform Commission of Canada recommended that 
both the habitual criminal and dangerous sexual offender legislation be 
abolished because it had concluded that the provisions had proven to be 
ineffective. For several reasons, such as the difficulty of reliably defining 
« dangerousness», and lack of fairness and procedural safeguards, the 
Commission believed that preventive detention was unnecessary.29 In their 
Working Paper Imprisonment and Release, the Law Reform Commission 
states : 
Serious offences, including sexual offences, should be dealt with under the 
ordinary sentencing law. If the offence warrants a sentence of imprisonment 
for purposes of separation, this offers the possibility of a long period of 
custody and release under controlled supervision where needed... In view of the 
limits of rehabilitation, the costs of over prediction... a possible sentence of up 
to twenty years in cases of serious violence against persons should be adequate 
to deal with offenders who are thought to be a continuing risk to the personal 
security of others.30 
Although the above comments are aimed at the pre-1977 dangerous 
sexual offender and habitual criminal provisions, the comments continue to 
be used by those proponents seeking to abolish the current dangerous 
offender legislation.31 
An additional problem which has recently surfaced is causing further 
uncertainty regarding the application of the legislation. 
Until lately it appeared that anyone found to be a « dangerous 
offender» would receive an indeterminate sentence, however, the practice 
has changed due to recent jurisprudence. « Split determinations» regarding 
dangerousness and indeterminate sentences are possible according to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal's decision in Regina v. Carleton.32 The Court 
refused to accept the trial judge's finding of dangerousness and agreed with 
his obiter dictum that a « dangerous offender » (so found) is not obliged to 
receive an indeterminate sentence. Although the trial judge decided that 
Carleton was a dangerous offender and did in fact impose a sentence of 
preventive detention, he concluded that the latter decision should not be 
considered as an automatic event following a positive determination of 
dangerousness. An appeal by Carleton from the Alberta Court of Appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada proved to be fruitless. Mr. Justice Dickson 
speaking on behalf of the Court dismissed the appeal indicating that no error 
29. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper # 11, Imprisonment and Release, 1975, 
page 27. 
30. Ibid., page 30. 
31. Supra, footnote 23, p. 1. 
32. (1981) 23 CR. (3d) 181 (Alta. CA.). 
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was found in the judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeal of 
Alberta". 
In Regina v. Ringland34, the defence counsel pursuaded the trial judge to 
respect the obiter remark in the Carleton case. Although, Mr. Justice Foisy 
found Ringland to be a dangerous offender, he refused to impose an 
indeterminate sentence believing that special treatment (which Ringland 
agreed to take) would substantially decrease the offender's sexual drive and 
aggressive tendencies. An application for leave to appeal based solely on the 
point of correctness of the « split determination» was made by the Crown to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal. The Court held that the trial judge had a 
discretion to impose a sentence other than one of indeterminate imprisonment 
and chose not to interfere with the exercise of his discretion34a. The 
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
dismissed34b. 
Since it appears that the current purpose of Part XXI is to sentence 
« dangerous offenders » for an indeterminate period, it is odd that a judge, 
after imposing the label « dangerous offender » on a person could then use a 
determinate sentence for the specific crime committed. Generally an indivi-
dual subjected to the provisions under Part XXI is penalized for the type of 
person he is rather than for the actual crime committed. Certainly under the 
current legislation a more logical approach would be to assess all the 
required evidence before a finding of «dangerous offender» is made, and 
then decide whether it would be in the public's interest to impose a sentence 
of preventive detention upon the offender. If so, the person found to be a 
«dangerous offender» would then automatically receive the sentence 
expected under Part XXI. Otherwise, there would be no actual benefit served 
by simply labelling a person as a « dangerous offender». It seems that the 
Supreme Court of Canada did not properly assess the Alberta Court of 
Appeal decision on this subject since the conclusion of a « split determi-
nation» appears illogical. 
The ability of psychiatrists to properly predict the behaviour of 
dangerous offenders is another feature which is often criticized.35 There was 
considerable controversy during the 1950's and 60's as to whether dangerous 
offenders could be accurately identified. It was not until the late 1960's, that 
33. Carleton v. The Queen, (1983) 6 C.C.C. (3d) 480, 36 CR. (3d) 39. 
34. R. v. Ring/and (unreported). Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Judicial District of 
Calgary, No. 81-01-C-0945, January 18, 1983. 
34a. R. v. Rignland (unreported), Court of Appeal of Alberta, Appeal No. 15104, March 9, 1984. 
34b. Leave to appeal refused May 17, 1984 (Coram : Estey, Mclntyre and Lamer JJ.) 
35. See M. PETRUNIK, The making of Dangerous Offenders: A Study of the Polities of 
Dangerousness, Unpublished Study, Ministry of the Solicitor General, Ottawa, 1979. 
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this criticism was recognized as valid as by that time it was recognized that 
no objective data of successful predictive skills could be offered by psy-
chiatrists as proof of their methods.36 
Greenland, commenting on the current dangerous offender provisions 
explains that : 
The most grievous failure of all has been that neither the Parole Board nor the 
psychiatrists and psychologists employed by it have demonstrated a capacity to 
reliably predict the DSO's future capacity for dangerous behaviour. The 
relatively high rate of parole revocations ; thirty-eight per cent, indicates the 
crude state of the art of clinical prediction... it can reasonably be assumed that 
this degree of error works in both directions." 
Greenland severely blames psychiatrists for taking part as expert 
witnesses in dangerous offender proceedings. He submits : 
... they have abandoned their primary function to provide competent medical 
service with compassion and respect for human dignity." 
According to one Canadian psychiatrist : 
As a psychiatrist I am frequently asked to make an assessment with regard to 
possible future dangerousness of a patient, and I must confess that I can find 
no firm psychiatric criteria for so doing." 
The problem and difficulty of predicting the likelihood of an offender's 
future conduct is a matter of concern as it pertains to the standard of proof 
required. Mr. Justice Morden declared in the judgment of R. v. Knight : 
I wish to make it clear that when I refer to the requisite standard of proof 
respecting likelihood, I am not imposing on myself an obligation to find it 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that certain events will happen in the 
future... (but rather) likelihood of future conduct.40 
The difficulty for the court to determine the likelihood of an offender's 
future conduct and the dissatisfaction directed towards the methods of 
psychiatric assessment of dangerous offenders has led many commentators 
to believe that the time has come to establish a study on the state of the art of 
psychiatric techniques of prediction so as to determine whether as much 
weight should be placed upon expert psychiatric evidence as has been in the 
36. Ibid., p. 15. 
37. Supra, footnote 23, p. 44. 
38. Ibid., p. 45. 
39. R. MCCALDON, «Reflections on Sentencing», (1974) 16 Can. J. Corr. 291, p. 295. Cited in 
his book Psychiatry Behind Bars, A Legal Perspective, 1982, Toronto, Butterworths and Co. 
Canada Ltd., p. 271 ; Marc E. Schiffer suggests reference be made to Tanner v. Norys, [1980] 
4 W.W.R. 33 (Alta. C.A.) regarding the ability of psychiatrists to predict dangerousness. 
40. R. v. Knight, (1976) 27 C.C.C. (2d) 343 (Ont. High Court), p. 356. 
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past. It is recommended that the appraisal of this area and its position 
between criminal law and psychiatry should occur before any significant 
criminal law reform on this subject takes place. 
4. Charter Considerations 
One can anticipate that sections 9 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms41 regarding protection against arbitrary detention or 
imprisonment and the right not to be subject to any cruel and unusual 
punishment respectively, will continue to be used in the courts by defence 
counsel to reject the use of indeterminate sentences until the matter is settled 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, thus far it appears there is little 
basis to these arguments. In R. v. Simon42 the Northwest Territories 
Supreme Court rejected Simon's contention that section 688 is rendered 
inoperative by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In his decision, 
de Weerdt J. explained that sections 9 to 12 of the Charter are analogous to 
section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights,43 which according to the Supreme 
Court of Canada did not affect the court's discretion to impose indeterminate 
sentences under relevant Criminal Code provisions : 
Section 688, in its present form, provides for a rational and principled 
determination to be made by the courts, always predicated on the establishment 
of a sufficient foundation in fact, so as to remove the imposition of a sentence 
of indeterminate detention under the section from the realm of arbitrariness 
contemplated under S. 9 of the Charter. And as to section 2, it need only be 
mentioned that both capital punishment and long minimum sentences of 
imprisonment have also been held to conflict with S. 2(b) of the Canadian Bill 
of Rights : Miller v. /?., (1977) 23 S.C.R. 680, (1976) 5 W.W.R. 711, 38 C.R.N.S. 
139, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 177, 70 D.L.R. (3d) 324, 11 N.R. 386, affirming (1975) 6 
W.W.R. 1, 33 C.R.N.S. 129, 24 C.C.C. (2d) 401, 63 D.L.R. (3d) 193; R. v. 
Shand, (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 65, 35 C.R.N.S. 202, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 23, 70 D.L.R. 
(3d) 395 (C.A.). These decisions, it seems to me, are fully consistent with the 
incisive and unanimous decision of all nine judges of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Ex Parte Malticks." 
Regarding the Simon case, it is interesting to note that the trial judge 
never referred to the « reasonable limit » provision of the Charter. Apparently, 
de Weerdt J. was convinced that there was no violation of section 9 and 12 in 
this matter which would have required the section 1 exception. Judging from 
the results of previous attempts to eliminate Part XXI's harsh sanction, it 
41. Cons I i tu lion Act, 1982, Pari 1. 
42. [1982] 5 W.W.R. 729 (N.W.T.S.C). 
43. R.S.C. 1970, App. III. 
44. Ibid., p. 732. 
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seems doubtful that the Supreme Court of Canada will reject its line of 
thinking in this area.45 
Although the Court of Appeal for the Northwest Territories overturned 
Judge de Weerdt's decision regarding the declaration that Simon was a 
« dangerous offender» under Part XXI of the Criminal Code, McClung J.A. 
made no mention in his oral judgment on behalf of the court that the trial 
judge's comments regarding the Charter were incorrect.46 
Another provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
could be offered to assist in an argument to restructure the use of Part XXI 
of the Criminal Code. An original method of attempting to attack the 
improper nature of the dangerous offender determination would be to use 
section 11(f) of the Charter. It provides : 
11. any person charged with an offence has the right... 
(f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military 
tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment 
for the offence is imprisonment for five years or more severe punish-
ment ; 
While it would probably be disputed that an individual found to be a 
« dangerous offender » and given an indeterminate sentence under section 688 
is not convicted of an offence per se but rather has his status determined ; it 
would be fair to contend that the decision as to his status results from the 
previous offence committed. Therefore, without trying to create an « extra-
vagant interpretation», the benefit of a jury trial in section 688 proceedings 
may be regarded as a right in future cases. To outrightly reject this 
proposition because it is not the offence which carries a potential penalty of 
more than five years imprisonment but rather the person's character that 
deems he could be subject to a penitentiary sentence for the rest of his days is 
a bizarre response. Ultimately, the determination of whether a jury decision 
is required should be based on the potential penalty available in a particular 
case. Disregarding section 11(f) when dealing with Part XXI would be a 
most unwelcome narrow interpretation and would, in the author's opinion, 
tend to « trivialize and diminish respect for the Charter».47 
45. R. v. Roestad, [1972] 1 O.R. 814, 19 C.R.N.S. 190, 5 C.C.C. (2d) 564, leave to appeal refused 
19C.R.N.S. 235n; Hatchwe/lv. Ä.J1974] 1 W.W.R. 307, 14 C.C.C. (2d) 556, reversed on 
other grounds [1976] 1 S.C.R. 39, [1975] 4 W.W.R. 68, 21 C.C.C. 201, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 
3 N.R. 571. The effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights was discussed in the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
46. Court of Appeal for the Northwest Territories, Edmonton Criminal Sittings, January 18, 
1983 (unreported). 
47. R. v. Altseimer, [1982] 38 O.R. (2d) 783. In this case, at page 788, Zuber J.A. stated the 
following in his penultimate paragraph : 
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Criticism could also be foreseen regarding Part XXFs provisions on 
conditional release. In light of the fundamental justice requirement of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,,48 the process of having the court 
rather than the National Parole Board review a dangerous offender's parole 
application arguably may be regarded as a more just proceeding under the 
circumstances of an indeterminate sentence. At present, while the dangerous 
offender defendant is allowed to have a lawyer assist him at his hearing, the 
extent of this assistance is limited by regulations under the Parole Act and 
Parole Board policy. Because of the serious consequence of possibly having 
to wait a futher two years following the initial unsuccessful attempt to obtain 
parole, a normal open court setting would amply provide the offender with 
an opportunity to present his case thoroughly. Such procedure would 
provide greater judicial awareness of the effects of indeterminate sentences. 
Formal procedures could be devised and implemented, setting out the 
manner in which the parties will state their case. Provisions within Part XXI 
could also be enacted to assist the judge in his decision as to whether parole 
should be graïited. Furthermore, mechanisms form appeal could be esta-
blished. Rigorous judicial supervision of indeterminate sentences would 
ensure that reports submitted to the court regarding the treatment received 
by the offender, his behaviour in the correctional facility, his current 
condition and prognosis for release under certain circumstances would be 
properly presented. Furthermore, such reform would provide an offender 
with what may be considered as an added protection in that his case would 
be receiving a « fresh look » after an initial period has passed. 
While one may argue that the National Parole Board should continue to 
review these cases since the considerations are the same in determining 
whether other parole applications ought to be granted, it should be 
remembered that an automatic date for mandatory supervision does not 
apply to persons given indeterminate sentences under the provisions of 
Part XXI. Therefore, potential for parole release depends entirely upon the 
discretion of the National Parole Board. 
In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Ontario, Mr. Justice 
Eugene Ewaschuk rejected the argument that Part XXI of the Criminal Code 
is a violation of the Charter. He concluded : 
» In view of the number of cases in Ontario trial courts in which Charter provisions are 
being argued, and especially in view of the bizarre and colourful arguments being 
advanced, it may be appropriate to observe that the Charter does not intend a trans-
formation of our legal system or the paralysis of law enforcement. Extravagant interpreta-
tions can only trivialize and diminish respect for the Charter which is a part of the supreme 
law of this country.» 
48. Section 7. 
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(It) is difficult to comprehend how the dangerous offender provisions of the 
Criminal Code would shock the general conscience so as to be intolerable in 
fundamental fairness given all the requirements and safeguards written into the 
process.48" 
Conclusion 
Whether the legislation regarding dangerous offenders ought to be 
eliminated altogether, as has been recommended in the past by the Law 
Reform Commission, deserves substantial consideration. Abolishing the 
current provisions is a viable option provided that a new sentencing 
structure could be created that would, within its realm, deal with dangerous 
offenders. This structure would, hopefully, not categorize such individuals as 
part of a special and separate group, as is the present situation, but rather as 
offenders who have committed significantly dangerous crimes, thus becoming 
liable to certain possible penalties (severe custodial sentences). In view of the 
availability of life sentences for a wide variety of defences (many of which at 
present trigger a dangerous offender application under Part XXI), the 
present sentencing structure is, in the author 's opinion, believed to be more 
than adequate. Hopefully, the effect of such change would eliminate existing 
regional disparities regarding the use of Part XXI 4 9 and bring Canadian Law 
in line with current laws in the United Kingdom,50 the United States 51 and 
48a. Re Moore and the Queen, [1984] 45 O.R. (2d) 3, p. 9. 
49. Supra, footnote 11. More than half of the •< dangerous offender » applications were made in 
Ontario. The breakdown is as follows : 4 in British Columbia, 6 in Alberta, 1 in 
Saskatchewan, 18 in Ontario, and 2 in Nova Scotia. Of these dangerous offenders, two (one 
in Ontario and one in Alberta) were given determinate rather than indeterminate sentences 
(Hand 10 years respectively). 
50. While the old habitual and dangerous sexual offender provisions were modelled on the 
United Kingdom's provisions, its legislation was repealed by the 1948 Criminal Justice Act 
which limited the use of preventive detention soon after Canada introduced these sections 
in 1947. Preventive detention was finally abolished in 1967 and replaced by the «extended 
sentence for persistent offenders». 
51. Recently several U.S. states repealed their indeterminate legislation which was similar to the 
existing Canadian provisions, following serious civil rights considerations. In 1977, the 
State of California eliminated indeterminate sentences by amending Chapter 7 of Title 1 of 
Part 3 of their Penal Code, relating to mentally disordered violent offenders. During the 
same year, the Governor of Maryland introduced a bill in the legislature which eventually 
abolished the indeterminate sentence of « defective-delinquants». Such offenders were 
defined by the Annotated Code of the State of Maryland as persons who, by the 
demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or criminal behaviour evidenced a 
propensity toward criminal activity, intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance... as to 
clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society. 
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other jurisdictions.52 Whether such change would be desirable politically is 
another matter entirely and one which would have to be dealt with by the 
government in power. 
In the event that the dangerous offender provisions continue to exist, or 
that some form of dangerous offender legislation is retained, the choice of 
trial and evidentiary procedures will need to be seriously reevaluated, since 
the failure, injustices and inconsistencies created by the current law results 
from these procedures. 
It is inevitable that Part XXI will be carefully scrutinized in the near 
future. Hopefully its dark face will be eliminated from the Criminal Code, 
leaving other sentencing options available to deal with dangerous offenders. 
To conclude the author provides the following quote by Plato believing 
that the wise words of this philosopher apply to the situation at hand : 
Mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not 
because they shrink from committing it.53 
52. Several European and Scandinavian Countries have been eliminating preventive detention 
under recidivist and dangerous offender legislation. The Danish Criminal Code (Preventive 
Detention for Dangerous Offenders, Section 70) was amended in 1973 and 1975 to 
substantially limit the category of offenders that could be subject to the «forvaring» 
(preventive detention sanction). Finland altered its Penal Code in 1977 by providing that 
recidivism is only one of four grounds for aggravating a sentence. While Finland continues 
to retain legislation pertaining to «dangerous recidivists», it only applies to situations 
where a history of extreme violence has occurred or been attempted. 
53. The Republic, Book I, 344-C. Translation by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford University Press. 
